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hen Robert Dahl coined the term of the “third 
transformation of democracy” (Dahl, 1994), he could 
not foresee the emergence of a transnational network 
society.1 Only twenty-five years after the publication of his article, 
we are in the midst of a fourth transformation of democracy in 
Europe. City-states have been replaced by nation-states in the 17th 
and 18th century, and nation-states were embedded in multi-level 
governance arrangements in the 20th century. In the 21st century, 
we are witnessing the emergence of a transnational network society 
organized around the opportunities of the digital revolution, 
cutting through nation-states and emptying the very idea of a 
national community of much of its empirical and normative 
content. Facebook, Twitter and Co. are not only profit-oriented 
enterprises, but also agents of global social integration. They 
provide important communication infrastructures and 
complement the world of states with a transnational level of 
interaction (Bohman, 2004, Grofman et al., 2014). The 
transnational network society is opening up a political horizon in 
which the traditional national loyalties represent only one form of 
political orientation among others (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). 
This new social structure is not only emerging in parallel to the 
national structures but is having a deeply disruptive effect on the 
old world’s social structures, communicative integration and its 
mode of political interest mediation. The much-described digital 
divide redesigns the map of worldwide society, generating or 
widening generational, geo-graphic, socio-economic and cultural 
divides. Already more than twenty years ago, Manuel Castells 
described this gap as giving expression to a world organized “in 
networks pertaining to a space of flows that links them up around 
the world, while fragmenting subordinate functions, and people, in 
the multiple space of places, made of locales increasingly 
segregated and disconnected from each other” (Castells, 1996, p. 
476). In this new world, cultural codes, value, and power are 
produced and decided in a “meta-network” that is often 
experienced as a “random sequence of events” following an 
                                               
1 An earlier version of this paper has been presented to the Academic Days on Open 
Government and Digital Issues, which took place on 11/13-14, 2018 and were organized 
by the IMODEV with the IRJS and the Université de Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. 
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“uncontrollable logic” and changing human experience 
fundamentally (ibid., p. 477).  
The twin impact of transnational integration and national 
fragmentation is challenging all political systems. Strongly 
opposing suggestions for how to cope with the advent of network 
society are clashing in the domestic arenas, and are putting the 
communicative capacities of modern societies under severe stress. 
What does all this imply for democracy in Europe? How should 
the relationship between the emerging network society and the 
world of democratic states be organized in order to safeguard 
democratic legitimacy? And what is the specific role of the EU in 
this process? The article argues that the transnational network 
society is unlikely to develop the necessary communicative 
infrastructure for updating the social contract of modern 
democracies autonomously. It is organized as an associative cluster 
rather than as a network association and thus lacks the necessary 
institutional infrastructure for meaningful political communication. 
The first best alternative is the European Union. It combines 
liberal ideas with an emphasis on cross-border communication and 
social responsibility, and is thus well equipped to address the 
challenges of the ongoing revolution. 
§ 1 – THE DEBATE 
The intellectual discourse on the proper constitutional principles 
governing the interface between the new world of networks and 
the old world of sovereignty is divided in two camps with strongly 
opposing and equally misleading suggestions. Libertarians 
challenge all forms of state interventions, submit a “declaration of 
independence” of the Internet (Barlow, 1996) and argue for a form 
of political organization based on the model of multi-stakeholder 
governance. Mueller (2017: 134) even claims that “the people of 
the internet” (meaning all those who are “sufficiently mobilized 
around the issue of Internet governance to weigh in”) should form 
a transnational popular sovereignty independent from state 
authority. It should displace the nation-states in all matters related 
to the regulation of the Internet and develop an own political 
identity. The Libertarian approach to constitutionalizing the 
transnational network society has strong backing in Silicon Valley 
but hardly any followers in the European debate. It is properly 
criticized for its lack of concern with those individuals who are not 
formally represented and who lack the skills to make their voice 
heard. Libertarianism is a severely elitist conception of political 
organization that pays hardly any respect to the fact that some are 
more capable of living up to the opportunities and challenges of 
the digital revolution than others. Libertarianism, in short, is 
insensitive to pressing challenges of the digital revolution and thus 
hardly adequate of leading the discussion. 
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On the other side of the debate, a number of authors harshly 
criticize unlimited internet freedom for its destructive effects on 
political communities. They point out that the anonymity of the 
internet allows hatemongers to propagate their rhetoric and 
strategies, recruit, organize and unify through websites, private 
message boards, listservers and email (Banks, 2010; Perry & 
Olsson, 2009). Their demand for a realignment of national borders 
and political control over the internet is joined by critics of the 
technological supremacy of the US. It is feared that the cyberspace 
is de facto becoming a space of US surveillance and control which 
can only be countered by a new emphasis on “technological 
sovereignty” (Reading, 2015), i.e. the realignment of the network 
society with national borders (Keller, 2013). Realigners and 
nationalists emphasize the right of political communities to self-
determine the substance and quality of their domestic discourses. 
At the same time, however, the emphasis on national borders as 
the defining structures for delineating communities is out-dated. 
Politics, the economy and society are following increasingly a 
transnational logic and it is hard to see how any of these the could 
be renationalized without fragmenting the Internet and destroying 
much of the promise of a more open and liberal world. China, Iran 
and other illiberal regimes around the world are already 
experimenting with national digital walls and provide good insights 
into the nightmare that a fragmented and governmentally 
controlled Internet could look like. 
This article pursues a third way siding with contributions that apply 
a deliberative approach to reflecting about the political order of a 
transnational social structure (Dryzek, 2006; Habermas, 2001). 
Deliberative approaches share the important strength of being 
analytically open to thinking legitimate political order outside of 
national boundaries. They emphasize communicative interaction as 
the backbone of democracy (Habermas, 1992; Bächtiger et al., 
2018) and trust in the will and the capacity of citizens to come to 
mutual agreements on matters of public interest. Political 
institutions are not merely instruments for government but are 
conceptualized as serving the purpose of facilitating open, 
transparent and constructive discourses and thus of taming power 
asymmetries. They allow all participants to engage in free 
discourses and to cooperate in the setting of rules and the shaping 
of the future of society (Habermas, 1992). This highly ambitious 
concept of political institutions is connected to an idea of an 
inclusive public in which good arguments are used by free and non-
dominated citizens for the collective production of the 
argumentative foundations of decision-making.  
In a deliberative perspective, the new information technologies are 
first of all an appreciated promise. They set the stage for a 
communicative world with lower transaction costs and more 
discourse and exchange among citizens. Citizens no longer need to 
buy international newspapers for having access to different point 
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of views and opinions but can process the opinions of the world 
by simply visiting webpages. They develop autonomously new 
public spaces for meeting and interacting, for learning from each 
other across cultures and nations, and for making the idea of a 
global civil society connected via discourse an emerging empirical 
reality. The new borderless world of communication can even give 
rise to the “historisch versunkene Gestalt eines egalitären 
Publikums von schreibenden und lesenden 
Konversationsteilnehmern” (Habermas 2008: 161).  
The critical reader will be quick to point out that the promise of a 
free transnational discourse among equals under conditions of 
non-domination is more of an idea than a reality. Illiberal states like 
China, Turkey, Iran and Russia have developed efficient and 
effective surveillance technologies and expanded governmental 
control into many areas formerly free of intervention. The 
Snowdon revelations have given clear evidence that even liberal 
governments can easily fall prey to the temptations of accumulating 
additional governmental powers. The challenge for democracy is 
more fundamental, however, than coping with governmental 
transgressions of legal and other normative constraints. The 
emerging digital society is putting at least three fundamental 
cornerstones of democracy under pressure. 
 The Contested Public Sphere 
A first challenge to deliberative democracy refers to the very idea 
of how we understand political communication and how we 
institutionalize it. Deliberative democracy conceptualizes public 
deliberation as being embedded in a multi-stage communicative 
process (Habermas, 1992: 431, Peters 1993). According to this 
model, it is the initially unfiltered opinions and views of individual 
citizens which meet in lifeworld substructures and rub against each 
other until some dominant and well-reflected position emerges. 
Association, unions and civil society organizations take the best of 
them on board and provide them with additional institutional 
leverage. The media do also take part in the process of selecting 
among the large variety of opinions those which are most 
convincing or which appeal to the largest audience. Parties are next. 
Looking for new political products to sell to their constituency, 
they scrutinize the different arguments voiced and select again 
those which refer to broadly held values and larger constituencies. 
Only those positions which make it through the whole process 
reach the final stage of legislation and will be subjected to 
majoritarian decision-making. This cumbersome process 
safeguards that almost everybody will finally have good reasons to 
accept majoritarian decisions even if they have opposed them in 
the first place.  
The institutionally embedded model of a democratic political 
public sphere is obviously difficult to reconcile with the culture and 
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the communicative practices of the transnational network society.2 
The transnational network society is established on a culture 
emphasizing more direct forms of interest articulation. Political 
parties, trade unions and other traditional forms of interest 
mediation are rapidly losing their central place in politics (Persily, 
2017) and are challenged by more direct modes of interest 
mediation such as the eDemocracia program in Brazil, or Parlement et 
Citoyens in France. New technologies allow people to make 
proposals to their representatives and work with them to improve 
bills and policies. The Better Reykjavík program allows people to 
suggest and rank ideas for improving the city. New parties are 
experimenting with grassroots decision-making in both digital and 
offline forums. Taiwan is currently experimenting with an 
innovative online-platform (vTaiwan) for organizing public 
discourses and intensifying communication between citizens and 
politics. In all of these cases, digital technologies are intended to 
improve representative democracy by supplementing it with direct 
democratic components (Hilpert, 2009).  
The ongoing structural change of the public is not limited to the 
emergence of new forms of interest mediation but also colonizes 
the world of traditional media. Almost all established media houses 
have acquired elaborate online presences, which are far more 
directly influenced by the readership than in the past. Today, the 
most important institution for determining the relevance of news 
is no longer exclusively the (supposedly elitist) editorial conference, 
at which general political considerations are weighed against the 
presumed demand on the part of the readership. The frequency 
with which readers click on certain contents and the time span they 
use for consuming them has become often more important for the 
selection of news and their prominence than anything else. All the 
major news providers now have technologies which record the 
frequency of viewing specific news content, the length of time a 
user stays on certain content and the intensity with which they 
read it. 
 Discursive Pluralism 
Deliberative communication is also closely linked to the 
precondition that discourse participants are interested in dissenting 
opinions and willing to deal with them seriously. Deliberative 
democracy involves trying to understand new arguments and 
insights, and questioning established traditions. Tolerance and 
openness are the basis for the recognition of the other as equal 
(Habermas 1998). In this sense, democracy is not only a procedure, 
but also an attitude of mind. It is in crisis when political positions 
                                               
2 For the time being “fehlen im virtuellen Raum die funktionalen Äquivalente für die 
Öffentlichkeitsstrukturen, die die dezentralisierten Botschaften wieder auffangen, 
selegieren und in redigierter Form synthetisieren” (Jürgen Habermas, Ach, Europa. 
Kleine politische Schriften XI, Frankfurt/M. 2008, S. 162). 
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become increasingly polarized and the different social layers and 
cultures of society stop trying to understand each other (Levitsky 
and Ziblatt 2018).  
This willingness to think and discuss across different sectors and 
cultures of society seems to be a critical factor in the networked 
world of peer-based relationships. According to Bennett and 
Iyenagar (2008), media use on the Internet is not only much more 
actively shaped by users, but also promotes one-sided information. 
The permanent selection of content by users tends to further 
strengthen existing opinions and attitudes and lead to users 
becoming “less informed and more polarized” (2008: 724). Eli 
Pariser (2011) coined the meanwhile famous metaphor of the 
“filter bubble”. Pariser referred to a “universe of information” that 
only showed us what we wanted to hear and read. The algorithms 
of the most common search engines are set up in such a way that 
they filter out from the mass of theoretically available information 
those that confirm our existing prejudices and make them available 
to us. YouTube suggests videos similar to those we’ve seen before, 
Amazon offers us products that match our previous demand 
profile, and Google customizes its search results so that 
suggestions are highly likely to reflect what users wanted to read in 
the past. As a result, it is feared that the consumption of content 
from the Internet acts like a mirror of ourselves, holding us in a 
bubble of self-affirmation and merely pretending to process new 
information. Moreover, users would neither notice the filter bubble 
nor escape from it. According to Pariser, they are living in 
increasingly disconnected worlds between which there is hardly any 
exchange and understanding. The consequences for the 
communicative cohesion of modern society are harmful. Societies 
lose the ability to communicate without even being aware of it and 
being able to take appropriate countermeasures. “The filter 
bubble,” Pariser judged, “is a centrifugal force that tears us apart”. 
Similarly, Blumler and Coleman (2015) argue that the increasing 
availability of various news sources and navigation technologies 
implies the risk of losing a shared life world. In return, companies 
would find it easier and easier to monitor and manipulate the 
audience.  
Most recent studies on the actual relevance of filter bubbles, 
however, arrive at more cautious and balanced results. Empirical 
data suggests that users are consciously choosing certain formats 
and content, and that FakeNews distributors are well aware that 
their perception differs from what is reported in the established 
media.3 The emergence of bubbles of dissent seems to be less due 
to people being unaware of biased information than to the explicit 
interest of users in dissenting opinions. This picture of deliberately 
formed - and thus controlled - bubbles is further reinforced by the 
                                               
3 http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/twitter-datenanalyse-wir-hatten-eine-falsche-
vorstellung-von-der-filterblase-a-1185406.html 
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fact that it seems to be a numerically rather small group that 
disseminates hate speech and obviously false reports. The fear that 
digital algorithms would tear apart the overall social 
communication context is therefore at least of today probably 
strongly exaggerated.4 
 Privatization 
A third challenge to the communicative capacity of society stems 
from the growing power of private providers of communicative 
infrastructure and the distortive effect that market principles might 
have on democratic deliberation. Ever since people have agreed on 
democratic procedures, it was clear that all interested citizens 
should have unhindered access to the most important places of 
consultation and decision-making. The central political places of 
discourse and democratic deliberation therefore have at all times 
been in public ownership. It would have been unacceptable to the 
ancient Romans just like the citizen of Athens to have private 
interests in control of the Forum Romanum or the Agora. The 19th 
and 20th century practice of modern democracies to allow private 
parties to run the media houses and thus to be in control of the 
infrastructures of democratic discourse was only acceptable as long 
as the market provided for a pluralistic structure of the media 
landscape. The domination of domestic politics by private parties 
has only too often proven to be highly risky. 
With a global market share of Google in the range of 80 per cent 
of all search requests, and a social media market share of 70 per 
cent for Facebook and Youtube,5 we are in the midst of an 
unprecedented concentration process of the communicative 
infrastructures of democracy. They are provided by private 
companies and access to them is controlled accordingly. Only 
those who enter into a private contractual relationship and pay 
their contribution either in monetary terms or in the form of 
economically usable data have a say. Unconditional participation, 
which is only linked to citizen status, is not provided for in the 
transnational network society. The private providers of these new 
spaces are self-assuredly claiming their right to design the new 
market places of ideas. Mark Zuckerberg, for example, states that 
the most important corporate goal for Facebook is to establish a 
social infrastructure for a global community. The claim is nothing 
less than to develop the communicative infrastructures of future 
transnational community-building: “Our goal is to strengthen 
existing communities by helping us come together online as well as 
offline, as well as enabling us to form completely new 
                                               
4 Cf. 27/5/2017, https://www.wired.com/2017/05/eli-pariser-predicted-the-future-
now-he-cant-escape-it/. 
5 https://www.faqdirect.com/search-engines-market-share/, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/265773/market-share-of-the-most-popular-social-
media-websites-in-the-us/; both visited 10/2/2018. 
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communities, transcending physical location. When we do this, 
beyond connecting online, we reinforce our physical communities 
by bringing us together in person to support each other.”6 
This claim is currently accepted by approx. 1 billion users world-
wide. There is probably no communicative infrastructure with a 
similar broad impact. Nor has there ever been. With the increasing 
relevance of digital public spheres, communication in society is 
increasingly shifting towards a market-driven sphere in which every 
speech act has a price. Today, the state provides neither the 
software of the Internet nor its most important content. In order 
to gain access to the digital agora, every citizen must purchase 
network access from a private provider. Political communication 
and participation are made conditional on payment. Providers of 
network infrastructure reserve the right to transport content at the 
speed (and thus also availability) that corresponds to their 
economic value, i.e. the price that providers of content are 
prepared to pay for transmission. This would be roughly 
comparable to a situation where not only the parliament building 
is owned by a private provider, and access to it is regulated 
according to economic criteria, but in which also the volume of the 
loudspeakers and the transmission of speeches to the outside world 
are subjected to market prices.  
With the increased power of providers of communicative 
infrastructures, the question of the openness of the network and 
discrimination against economically weaker players has become 
important. Violations of net neutrality are not a theoretical 
question, but a practically important problem. A number of cases 
from the recent past show the significance of the problem when 
economic interests become the guardians of discourse. In 
December 2017, for example, the US Federal Communications 
Commission abolished the requirement of net neutrality and 
allowed companies to design future data flow according to 
economic criteria. In the future, providers will be able to allocate 
additional costs to unpopular content or reduce their flow rate. In 
Europe, there is widespread practice of so-called zero rating. This 
means that telecom companies do not credit selected services to 
the data volume of users. Conversely, this means that all other 
services are charged with additional costs. 
Even well-intentioned government regulations cannot solve the 
problem easily: The Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz (Network 
Enforcement Act) in Germany, for example, stipulates that 
Internet platforms must delete illegal content within a short period 
of time or face high penalties. It is not the courts but the employees 
of the social networks who decide whether the law is to be applied 
in over 20 complex criminal offences, ranging from incitement of 
the people to hatred, or the formation of terrorist groups. In 
                                               
6  https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/building-global-
community/10154544292806634/, visited 9/17/2018. 
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addition, the law does not provide for a claim for recovery in the 
case of unjustified removal of content. Whoever expresses a 
legitimate opinion on the Internet and is wrongly deleted is not 
protected by the law. Companies thus have a strong incentive to 
filter out anything that might be offensive in any way. This is clearly 
expressed in the practice of Facebook: according to the civil rights 
organisation “Reporters without Borders”, Facebook received just 
under 1,000 complaints in the last reporting year, mostly for 
incitement to hatred (247), insult (460), defamation (407) and 
slander (342). At the same time, however, Facebook has removed 
tens of thousands of contents for violations of its own house rules.7 
The competence to identify hatred, discrimination, criminal 
offences, etc., is in fact delegated to actors who apply economic 
criteria and undisclosed algorithms. In this way, economic interests 
become the de facto guardian of public discourse.  
These examples clearly illustrate that any economically motivated 
regulation of public discourse is in open contradiction to 
democratic standards. Here, of course, it can be argued that these 
examples are not yet really dramatic. There can be not yet talk of a 
fundamental distortion of democratic discourse and a serious 
weakening of democracy. And it is also true that the market was in 
the past a major driver of innovation. All this is right and wrong at 
the same time. It is true insofar as the vast majority of messages 
still moves freely through the Internet - regardless of whether they 
are rated as true or false by a provider. However, it is also true that 
the question of net neutrality is a question of principle. Net 
neutrality goes to the substance of democratic infrastructures and 
hands over a central precondition of democracy to actors who 
ultimately pursue other goals. This is simply unacceptable from a 
democratic point of view. Today, democracy must re-appropriate 
its own infrastructures if it is not to accept the dominance of 
market principles over civil liberty and the pursuit of justice. 
§ 2 – POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 
It is highly doubtful whether the emerging transnational network 
society will be capable of autonomously meeting any of the 
challenges for deliberative democracy. It is organized as an 
“associative cluster” rather than as a proper network (Mueller, 
2013: 42). Network organizations have a well-defined point of 
access and clearly defined criteria for inclusion and exclusion. They 
are bounded and consciously arranged, and their participants 
pursue a common objective. Associative clusters are a weaker form 
of organization. They are not created by purpose and denote a 
relational pattern among an unbound set of actors (Scharpf, 1997: 
146) without any single point of administration nor of decision-
                                               
7 https://rsf.org/en/news/german-facebook-law-creates-risk-over-blocking, visited 
9/17/2018. 
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making. Simply put, the network society does neither have agency 
nor only the institutions necessary for collective will-formation. 
 The States and Due Diligence 
In the absence of autonomous democratic self-regulation, it is the 
democratic states that are in charge of accepting responsibility for 
the common good of free and unhindered democratic discourses. 
States have both the resources and the constitutional obligation for 
safeguarding democratic procedures. States do also have 
obligations according to the principle of due diligence. This 
principle is firmly anchored in international law and can be found 
today in areas as diverse as environmental and cyber policy 
(Bonnitcha & McCorquodale, 2017). The central idea of the 
principle is that states have a duty to do everything necessary to 
ensure that other states do not suffer damage from avoidable 
activities emanating from their territory. For example, German 
pollutants should not discharge harmful substances into rivers 
crossing the border into France. In cyber policy, states are obliged 
to take all necessary measures to prevent domestic non-state actors 
from launching attacks on foreign governmental or non-
governmental entities (Bendiek, 2013). What is decisive here is that 
all states have a general duty to behave responsibly in the sense that 
everything expected and reasonable is done to prevent damage to 
others.  
The due diligence principle is also relevant for the democratic 
quality of states. Immanuel Kant described already more than 200 
years ago that individual democratic states can only feel secure if 
their neighbors are also democracies (Kant 1795/2008). 
Furthermore, under conditions of complex interdependence, states 
are subject to multiple external effects of decisions adopted by their 
neighbors. Democracies therefore have a right to demand that 
other states undertake all necessary measures in order to guarantee 
that their democratic procedures remain uncorrupted and their 
external effects tamed by the discipline of democratic self-restraint. 
In this sense, democracy is not a national matter only, but also an 
international responsibility towards other societies. Regarding 
democratic governance in the transnational network society, a 
number of concrete implications for national policy can be derived 
from this.  
First of all, states have a responsibility for ensuring domestic 
pluralistic media discourses. All excessive concentration processes 
must be counteracted accordingly. Even if no systematic attempts 
at political influence can be observed at present, there is always the 
risk that power has a corrupting effect in the future and will be 
used for a selective provision of information. Precaution demands 
to force Google, Facebook and other important suppliers of 
communicative infrastructure to disclose their search algorithms 
or, alternatively, to develop independent, competitive and publicly 
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controlled substitutes. Ultimately, it is not easy to see why there are 
demanding criteria for the admission of passenger cars to road 
traffic, but not for the communicative infrastructures of 
democracy. It is also disturbing to notice that the large tech 
companies have started to acquire major newspapers such as the 
Washington Post (Amazon) or the Time Magazin (Salesforce). In 
order to safeguard media pluralism, states will have to keep a close 
eye on these processes and get ready to intervene before the public 
influence of organized interests becomes too strong for 
governments to be checked successfully.  
Democratic states also retain the responsibility to take all necessary 
measures in the area of data protection and privacy to ensure the 
sovereignty of their citizens. If private corporations accumulate 
enough knowledge about citizens to be able to influence them 
selectively, there is a very real danger that formerly autonomous 
decisions are affected by deliberate strategies of cleverly designed 
nudging. This fundamentally involves a responsibility on the part 
of the state vis-à-vis its citizens to counter all illegitimate practices 
of collecting and using of private data by third parties. Again, it 
may be necessary to force companies of a certain size to disclose 
their algorithms. 
 Regulating in Europe 
The principle of due diligence and its policy implications are easier 
to formulate than implement. States may in themselves have an 
interest in a democratic network society and also in democratically 
constituted neighbors. States do also, however, pursue a multitude 
of other interests that are often more pressing in the short-term. 
The European Union has an important role to play here. A future 
European democratic communication policy would center around 
common norms and rules for the market of opinions. It would 
provide for open and transparent discourses and safeguard that the 
infrastructures of democratic discourses are unimpeded by non-
democratic concerns. The principle of democracy would replace 
the still prevailing market principle.  
Accepting the role of being in charge of democratic 
ordnungspolitik in Europe would mean to accept that democracy 
in Europe can today only mean European democracy. The 
common market has provided for a regulatory frame in which no 
member state can autonomously regulate its communicative space 
without infringing on the freedoms of goods and services, and thus 
to act beyond European law. The member states have tied 
themselves de jure and de facto to a common regulatory discipline 
according to which they all enjoy the benefits of high consumer 
standards, data protection and a pluralistic media landscape, or 
suffer from its deficiencies. National regulations of market-related 
services are no longer either feasible or legal. 
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The EU should also not shy away from accepting the external 
effects of its internal policies. The new General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) is an interesting case in point. It sets out the 
ambitious principles of purpose limitation, data minimization, 
accuracy, the limitation of storage, and integrity and confidentiality. 
The GDPR has effects that go beyond Europe and even affect the 
US market. “Ironically, many Americans are going to find 
themselves protected from a foreign law”, said Rohit Chopra, the 
Democratic commissioner at the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTA) (Romm et al. 2018). The EU has emerged as the most 
powerful regulator of Silicon Valley, “stepping in where 
Washington has failed or simply has been unwilling to limit some 
of the United States’ most lucrative and politically influential 
companies” (ibid.). For global companies like Google, Facebook 
or Amazon, it is neither an option to leave the European market 
nor to organize their business along two different sets of legal 
regulations. Data’s inherent mobility necessitate de facto 
transnational regulation, even if that is politically not welcome in 
some of the markets. It is by far more efficient to implement the 
rigid European regulations on a global scale than to try aligning 
digital markets with national borders, and thus to offer to the 
American consumer the level of protection intended for 
Europeans only. The outcome is straight forward: although legally 
only aiming to safeguard EU customers who rely on foreign based 
services, the EU de facto extends the territorial reach of its data 
protection law, forcing foreign market participants to obey EU law 
irrespective of whether they serve EU, US or any other customers 
(Bendiek, 2013). 
It is, finally, also true that political interventions into the public 
discourse and its infrastructure should not only be ambitious, but 
also modest. Political institutions must shy away from any 
unwarranted interference into free speech. Legal interventions do 
always have the negative side-effect of not only threatening 
democratic liberties but also the openness of the Internet. Already 
today can we observe how national legal regulations have an 
increasingly fragmenting effect (Mueller, 2017). Regulatory 
interventions must therefore not lead to state leapfrogging and the 
misguided idea of renationalizing the Internet. The transnational 
network society is an outstanding achievement that has achieved 
an enormous number of positive things. Here we find another 
good reason for allocating respective powers to the EU. As a 
supranational entity presiding over twenty-eight member states 
with own regulatory traditions, the EU must respect a large variety 
of regulatory traditions and philosophies. It does hardly ever 
impose rigid laws on its member state addressees but most often 
applies directives which only detail the aim of an intervention 
without specifying the applicable tools. The EU’s governance 
mechanism is neither built on bureaucratic hierarchy nor on the 
application of majoritarian decision-making but on deliberative 
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interaction among the member states and the principle of 
subsidiarity (Neyer, 2012). The EU is thus forced to realize a sound 
mixture of regulatory restraint with a firm commitment to 
democratic norms. 
 Empowering Citizens 
No reform agenda is complete without situating the individual. At 
the end of the day, it is neither the EU nor the state which fosters 
change but citizens who undertake the necessary steps. As it is 
today, however, many citizens feel overwhelmed by the speed of 
change and are only too often content to observe the new 
economic giants revolutionizing the political and social world. An 
important element of changing this is to reform academic 
education. What is needed today is a new type of academic 
education which combines transdisciplinary science with an 
entrepreneurial spirit.  
Such a combined form of university education would be founded 
on understanding the digital society in its many different aspects. 
Lawyers can teach about tectonic shifts in legal regimes, the 
overlapping of national, European and international regulations, 
and the many new legal challenges to the digital European society. 
Economists and sociologists can help understanding the logic of 
the platform economy and the effects of ever more flexible forms 
of labor on welfare regimes. Political scientists can analyze new 
forms of interest mediation and their comparative advantages and 
disadvantages to representative democracy. And the humanities, 
finally, can set all this in the bigger context and help us understand 
how the changes resonate with and change our culture and the very 
way we live together. 
Understanding is important, but not enough. In an age where 
global corporations invest billions of Euro every year in 
revolutionizing the economy, society and culture, we must re-
empower the next generation of graduates to become agents of 
democratic digital change. We need a new class of university 
institutions which equip students with the entrepreneurial and the 
technical skills for developing and implementing new not-for-
profit ideas. Study programs are needed that transgress the divide 
between theory-oriented traditional universities and practice-
oriented universities of applied sciences and thus contribute to 
empowering graduates to transform ethical aspirations into 
practical impact.  
CONCLUSION 
This short text cannot offer any definitive answer to the question 
of whether the fourth transformation of democracy will invite a 
new era of more deliberation, participation and better governance 
or whether the structural changes in social stratification processes 
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and the public sphere will erode necessary preconditions for 
democracy. It might well be that new transnational opportunities 
for participation are developing in parallel with a devaluation of the 
substance of national representative democracy. Whatever the 
future might bring, it will be important to understand that 
democracy must no longer be thought of as a domestic structure 
only. Its integrity is closely tied to the way how we constitutionalize 
its interface with the emerging transnational network society. 
Europe has an important role to play here. It must not succumb to 
the temptation of dramatic interventions such as the breaking up 
of large tech companies or the state-run establishment of 
competitors to Google, Amazon and other tech companies. A 
more modest but nevertheless crucial step towards harmonizing 
the network world with democratic standards is already taken if the 
major players in the network world become more transparent and 
disclose their algorithms, and if Europe self-consciously accepts its 
responsibility to champion the cause of its citizens. This is where 
the European Union is called upon today. Such a move will reduce 
mistrust and create the basis for a more constructive integration of 
the transnational network society into the democratic world of 
states. 
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